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 Maani 1 
Introduction 
Between 2010 and 2014, the suburban community of Beavercreek, Ohio made national 
headlines when Beavercreek City Council continually denied the Greater Dayton Transit 
Authority (RTA) permission to install bus stops at The Mall at Fairfield Commons.  Dayton-
based civil rights group Leaders for Equality & Action (LEAD) filed an allegation with the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Office of Civil Rights stating Beavercreek City 
Council’s refusal to allow public transportation into the suburb had a desperate socioeconomic 
impact on RTA’s majority-minority ridership.  The FHWA Office of Civil Rights quickly 
brought a federal lawsuit against the City of Beavercreek as they violated Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 by barring black Daytonians from reaching the suburb along federally funded 
highways.  Therefore, the FHWA threatened to halt all highway funding to the City of 
Beavercreek, forcing the suburb to open bus stops at the The Mall at Fairfield Commons in 2014.  
The Beavercreek case marked the first time the FHWA found a municipality to be using federal 
funding in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 
This controversy in Beavercreek had its immediate causes, but it also resulted from 
nineteenth century industrialization, which brought about new means of transportation, 
discriminatory New Deal housing policies beginning in the Great Depression, and the 
affordability of homeownership along with automobiles after the Second World War.  To many 
Americans, Beavercreek City Council’s defense against RTA’s proposal seemed like a logical 
reaction: white suburbanites use automobiles while black inner-city residents use public 
transportation.  More importantly, Americans often view the layout of metropolitan America – 
                                                      
1 Free To Ride, directed by Mathew Martin (2016; The Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race 
and Ethnicity), Vimeo. 
 Maani 2 
ubiquitous with black urban cores surrounded by all-white suburbs, homeownership, and 
automobiles as the primary means of transportation – as the standard way all cities are structured.   
Furthermore, it is often believed that American cities have always been racially 
segregated, despite suburbanization having only begun in the late-nineteenth century.  This 
misperception of American cities ignores the historical realities in New Deal Era housing 
policies under the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) promoted suburban homeownership and racial segregation over older and 
heterogeneous neighborhoods.  The construction of the Interstate Highway System solidified 
postwar development, making automobiles the only way to reach developing suburbs like 
Beavercreek.  This helped cause streetcar companies to go out of business, ending the era of 
mass-transit in America.  Additionally, this helped to relocate business and industry around 
interstates, increasingly inaccessible to low-income Daytonians who could not afford an 
automobile. 
During late-1960s, urban riots occurred throughout American cities as blacks protested 
their socioeconomic conditions, including Dayton in 1966.  Many suburbanites blamed the result 
of the immoral and meritless culture of black Americans, as well as planned antagonisms by 
Black Power leaders.  However, several factors in addition to housing discrimination perpetuated 
the Dayton Riot of 1966, including urban renewal, police brutality, and the failure of Dayton-
based War on Poverty agencies.  The Dayton riots helped rationalize the transition from 
commuting to Dayton’s central business district to suburban malls, where it was believed to be 
safer due to a segregated atmosphere. 
Urban historians argue that the form suburbanization has taken in the United States 
represents the cultural values embodied in the rural dethatched home, which Americans have 
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celebrated over other forms of dwellings.  Kenneth T. Jackson in Crabgrass Frontier argues that 
the segregated and sprawled nature of US cities is largely a cultural phenomenon of the United 
States – unlike most of the world – because many Americans have romanticized pastoral 
landscapes and because suburbs in this country developed around new forms of transportation, 
discriminatory housing policies, as well as cheaply mass-produced detached homes.2  Many 
white suburbanites today idealize the image of 1950s suburbia as the only viable residential 
option.  In Building the Dream, Gwendolyn Wright argues that despite many white suburbanites 
having largely monolithic housing ideals, Americans have long occupied and idealized various 
forms of dwellings other than 1950s suburban homes.  Moreover, Wright contends that many 
whites romanticize this era as having had no racial problems while simultaneously providing a 
safe haven for whites against the racial and socioeconomic problems of cities.3 
The history of suburbanization in the United States provides context for the recent 
transportation controversy in Beavercreek.  While many Beavercreek residents idealize the 
image of 1950s suburbia, believing it is natural for their community to be racial segregated and 
lack public transportation, this notion ignores the diverse housing history in Dayton.  More 
importantly, it ignores the fact that the detached suburban home was not always the American 
ideal.   
Suburbanization began in Dayton in the late-nineteenth century due to the advent of the 
streetcar which allowed wealthy industrialists of the National Cash Register Corporation (NCR) 
to move the streetcar suburb of Oakwood.  Urban blight and pollution in addition to growing 
                                                      
2 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York 
City, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), 3-11. 
3 Gwendolyn Wright, Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America (New York 
City, NY: Pantheon Books, 1981), xv-xix. 
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black and immigrant populations caused wealthy whites to build mansions and summer estates in 
Oakwood in an effort to live aristocratic lifestyles distinguished from the working-class.  The 
Victorian Era ideal during the turn of the nineteenth century in Dayton was only accessible to 
upper-class whites with restrictive covenants barring most minorities.  Homeownership, 
furthermore, was extremely expensive and only those wealthy enough to pay their mortgages in-
full could purchase homes.  After the Dayton Flood of 1913 and during the Great Depression, 
Dayton experienced an acute housing crisis, causing many Daytonians to live in a variety of 
housing forms from temporary units to urban apartments. 
Almost seventy years before the controversy in Beavercreek, the Second World War 
fundamentally altered the course of suburbanization in Dayton as the federal government funded 
the development of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), which became Montgomery 
County’s largest employer, causing eastward trajectory of suburbanization.  The HOLC and the 
FHA subsidized low-interest mortgages on suburban homes in an effort to relieve the housing 
crisis while simultaneously enforcing racial segregation.  Through FHA subsidization and new 
means of mass-production, entrepreneurs in Dayton including Charles H. Huber built new mass-
produced suburban communities.  While racial segregation was an important factor for many 
white Daytonians, the mass-produce home became commonplace during the Postwar Era due to 
the fact that suburban homeownership was frequently the more affordable than urban renting.   
Furthermore, as automobiles became more affordable and suburbs developed around 
roadways, it brought an end to the need for public transportation in suburban development.  This 
caused largest segments of the white middle-class and businesses to relocate around suburban 
interstates rather than railroads, which diminished Dayton’s tax base, furthered urban blight, 
created failing public schools, and lowered employment opportunities.  This worsening of the 
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socioeconomic problems in cities like Dayton due to suburbanization only reinforced notions 
whites held about blacks and the urban core.  Therefore, in an effort to attract revenue back to 
America’s central business districts, the Housing Act of 1949 allowed investors to conduct urban 
renewal projects.  Many of these projects bulldozed black neighborhoods.  A combination of real 
estate discrimination, FHA policies, and urban redevelopment worked together to segregate West 
Dayton. 
 By the late-1960s, as suburbanization and urban renewal unfolded, numerous black 
Daytonians saw firsthand how the Civil Rights Movement limited success in the North as most 
Dayton businesses still followed an unspoken rule of racial segregation which not only barred 
blacks from swimming pools and restaurants, but from employment opportunities as well.  The 
Civil Rights Movement helped bring about new legislation including the War on Poverty, 
establishing and funding agencies in an attempt to address the socioeconomic problems within 
black neighborhoods.  Both founded in the mid-1960s, Supporting Committee on Preventative 
Effort (SCOPE) and Moving Ahead Together (MAT) were Dayton’s two primary civil rights 
organizations which received federal funding for the War on Poverty.  Although, bureaucratic 
and inter-organizational disagreements over federal funding within SCOPE and MAT caused the 
organizations to be ineffective, disillusioning many within Dayton’s black community towards 
federal civil rights programs.   
The inability of organizations like SCOPE and MAT, however, to end systemic housing 
and employment discrimination against blacks helped spark the Dayton Riot of 1966.  Many 
African Americans throughout the United States held similar sentiments which brought about 
nationwide riots from Watts, California in 1965 to Newark, New Jersey in 1967.  Although the 
unprovoked murder of a black man named Lester Mitchell by a white man ignited the Dayton 
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Riot of 1966, long-held animosities and grievances towards the conditions on the black Westside 
fueled the Dayton riot.  Dayton newspapers over-reported on black youths looting white-owned 
stores as well as attacking white motorists.  Suburbs protected their shared borders with the City 
of Dayton by barring public transportation in order to protect whites from black Westside 
residents using public transportation. 
The destruction and looting which occurred during the Dayton Riot of 1966 motivated 
businesses to relocate from downtown while simultaneously helping to cause whites to frequent 
suburban malls.  Many whites feared taking their families downtown after the riots and 
appreciated the segregated atmospheres of suburban stores.  Developers built malls around 
interstate highway corridors which made malls practical for the automobile owners but almost 
inaccessible for urbanites reliant on public transportation.  The Salem Mall opened in Dayton in 
1966 followed by the Dayton Mall in suburban Miamisburg in 1970.  Although, once the RTA 
provided public transportation to the Dayton Mall, white shoppers increasingly complained about 
black youth, and contributed to the shopping center’s decline by associating black youth with 
criminal behavior.  
 At approximately the same time, suburban elites worked to preserve their independence.  
Beginning in 1964, the Committee of Eleven fought a sixteen-year legal battle for the municipal 
incorporation of Beavercreek Township as a means of preserving racially homogeneous schools 
out of fear their children would be corrupted by black youth they associated with the riots.  The 
suburban communities of Beavercreek Township and Fairborn developed heavily after the 
Second World War due to the growth of WPAFB and the opening Wright State University 
(WSU).  Therefore, when the already incorporated City of Fairborn proposed to annex 
Beavercreek Township in 1964, residents feared the working-class suburb of Fairborn would 
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bring black people and crime into their community.  As a result, local elites established the 
Committee of Eleven to resist the City of Fairborn.  Although the campaign for incorporation 
truly gained momentum in 1972 when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) filed Brinkman v. Gilligan and requested a busing program for the 
desegregation of all schools in the Dayton Metropolitan Area.  The primary goal of the 
Committee of Eleven quickly became not only protecting their community from Fairborn, but 
from Dayton Public Schools, where parents believed criminal black youth would corrupt their 
children.  The City of Beavercreek would not incorporate until 1980, yet it successfully avoided 
racial integration with Fairborn and Dayton. 
As WPAFB and WSU rapidly developed in the late-twentieth century, Interstate 675 East 
(I-675) opened in 1987 allowing easier automobile access to Fairborn and Beavercreek.  More 
importantly to the busing controversy, I-675 physically divided the suburbs of Fairborn and 
Beavercreek, helping to bar RTA ridership in Fairborn from entering Beavercreek.  In 1993, The 
Mall at Fairfield Commons opened at the I-675 corridor in Beavercreek.  With no RTA access to 
The Mall at Fairfield Commons, this implicitly assured many whites of a segregated atmosphere, 
helping to expedite the decline of the Dayton Mall.  As deindustrialization continued in Dayton 
into the twenty-first century, The Mall at Fairfield Commons increasingly became a hub for 
employment in the Dayton area.  Due to the fact that municipalities in the Miami Valley Region 
have to agree to join RTA, Beavercreek never welcomed public transportation from Dayton and 
consequentially forced urban residents to trek the dangerous non-pedestrian overpass across I-
675 to reach their jobs at the mall. 
Part I of this thesis critiques the monolithic view of many people hold of US cities and 
explores the various forms of housing and transportation idealized throughout Dayton’s history.  
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It investigates how the advent of new means of transportation such as the streetcar and 
automobile encouraged the development of suburbs like Oakwood and Huber Heights in 
different eras, while simultaneously discriminatory housing policies promoted ownership of 
single family homes and segregated metropolitans.  Part II examines how decades of housing 
discrimination confined large parts of Dayton’s black population to the Westside while urban 
renewal, police brutality, and high unemployment perpetuated poor socioeconomic conditions in 
the neighborhood.  This section explores the inter-organizational conflicts within SCOPE and 
MAT which prevented the organizations from conquering these urban problems.  Their limited 
successes led to disillusionment which helped ignite the Dayton Riot of 1966.  Part II also 
examines the attitudes white suburbanites subsequently developed after the riot which influenced 
their belief that segregation resulted from black culture and personal failures.  Part III begins 
with the establishment of the Committee of Eleven in 1964 and details how they spent sixteen 
years fighting for incorporation in order to protect their business interests, low tax rates, and 
avoid school desegregation.  Part III then compares the campaign for incorporation by the 
















 Part I 
The Dayton Metropolitan Area is currently home to 800,909 residents, only 141,368 of 
whom live within Dayton’s municipal boundaries, while the other 659,541 residents are sprawled 
throughout the suburbs.1  Dayton’s periphery primarily houses the white middle-class while the 
urban core is home to a high concentration of low-income minorities.  To many Daytonians, this 
seems to be natural and the way cities in the United States have always been.  Even in the 1960s, 
despite the fact that Beavercreek became a populated suburb after the Second World War, the 
Committee of Eleven argued for incorporation in an effort to preserve “historical Beavercreek.”2  
However, since the late-nineteenth century, Daytonians have lived in different types of suburbs 
which reflected the housing policies and means of transportation at that time.   
Although the arrangement of cities and suburbs may seem arbitrary to many Daytonians 
today, the arrangement of the metropolis grew out of three important historical trends.  The first 
trend was the advent of the streetcar in the late-nineteenth century allowed for the Dayton suburb 
of Oakwood to develop.  Wealthy industrialists developed Oakwood into an aristocratic suburb 
that freed them from the urban pollution and congestion, where the primary forms of housing 
were mansions and summer estates.  New domestic ideologies designated the detached home as 
the white family’s refuge from the crime, poverty, and vices brought on by overcrowding and 
blight in Dayton’s urban core, which they contributed to inherent “immoralities” within black 
and immigrant communities.  The second trend occurred during the Great Depression.  The New 
Deal established the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, 
                                                      
1 “Data USA: Search, Map, Compare, and Download US Data,” Data USA, www.datausa.io 
2 “Fairborn proposes annex of Beavercreek twp. area,” 1956-1980, MS-112, Series I: 
Administration, boxes 1-3, “Who What Why: Chapter 1,” Wright State University archives, 
Fairborn, Ohio. 
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agencies which provided low-interest mortgages primarily for the construction of suburban 
detached homes.  These federal agencies based real estate values on the age and demographics of 
neighborhoods, prioritizing new detached homes in all-white suburbs over older homes within 
the urban core.  This effectively segregated residential areas and economically deprived central 
business districts.  The third trend was the mass-produced suburbs along interstates after the 
Second World War.  Charles H. Huber benefited from federal housing policies and the 
automobile by creating the mass-produced suburb of Huber Heights for working-class 
Daytonians.  The affordability of homeownership after the New Deal coupled with the 
development of the Interstate Highway System helped further segregate Dayton and made 
Daytonians increasingly reliant on automobiles to reach peripheral jobs. 
The density, walkability, location of upper-class residents, and distinction between urban 
and rural life defined American cities until the Industrial Revolution in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Prior to the Industrial Revolution, throughout the world, the only way to travel long 
distances was by horse or by foot.  Therefore, most urban centers were small enough that most 
residents could cross them relatively easily on foot.  During the seventeenth century, American 
cities such as Boston and Philadelphia, for example, never extended over 1 mile in radius from 
their city centers.3  Because walkability was central to preindustrial American cities, the 
wealthiest residents lived closest to the city center as property values increased due to centrality.  
More importantly, unlike today, there was a clear distinction between urban and rural landscapes, 
as the edge of the city ended with countryside.  Additionally, extended families lived together 
and tended to have their family businesses attached to their homes.  While people of different 
socioeconomic statuses lived in separate neighborhoods, due to urban density, these 
                                                      
3 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 12-19. 
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neighborhoods bordered each other, causing people of diverse backgrounds to come in contact 
with one another.4  These characteristics of “walking cities” defined the City of Dayton in the 
nineteenth century.  In his Master’s thesis Transportation Revolution and the Development of 
Oakwood, Ohio, 1870-1930, Kenneth D. Miller writes: “The intersection of Third and Main 
streets historically represented the commercial center of Dayton.  A circle of only one mile 
radius, centered on that intersection, encompassed virtually the entire city of Dayton as it existed 
in 1869.”5   
Dayton only extended beyond its walking city borders once industrialization began in the 
mid-nineteenth century with the introduction of streetcars and canals.  The completion of the 
Miami-and-Erie Canal 1845, in addition to the arrival of steam railroad in 1849, jumpstarted 
industrialization in Dayton.6  The canal allowed for commodities manufactured in Dayton to 
travel south to New Orleans along the Ohio and Mississippi rivers while the Baltimore-and-Ohio 
and Pennsylvania Railroads connected Dayton to industrial hubs including New York City and 
Chicago.7   
By the late-nineteenth century, already Dayton 25 percent of all Daytonians worked in 
manufacturing.8  Dayton’s population boomed as a direct result not only to the labor demand, but 
the city’s ability to construct more housing along horsecar lines.  In 1810, Dayton’s only had 383 
residents, but its population grew to 10,977 in 1850 upon industrialization and rose to 116,577 by 
                                                      
4 Ibid, 12-19. 
5 Kenneth David Miller, “Transportation Revolution and the Development of Oakwood, Ohio, 
1870-1930” (Master’s thesis, Wright State University, 1998), 27. 
6 Ibid, 27. 
7 Ibid, 27. 
8 Bruce W. and Virginia Ronald, The Lands Between the Miamis: A Bicentennial Celebration of 
the Dayton Area (Landfall Press, 1996), 12-19. 
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1910.9  As industrialization made many Daytonians wealthy, they began investing their wealth 
into new homes in communities built along streetcar lines.  In 1869, investors established the 
Dayton Street Railway Company and built the city’s first horse-drawn streetcar line traveling 
from West Third Avenue at Western Avenue to East Third Street at Findlay Street.10  The advent 
of the horsecar allowed the suburb of Oakwood to develop into an aristocratic enclave, where the 
ideal homes consisted of mansions and summer estates. 
The platting of Oakwood established the first upper-class suburb of Dayton.  Before this 
point, wealthy Daytonians had to live in proximity to the neighborhoods of people of various 
socioeconomic backgrounds.  The streetcar allowed wealthy whites to leave the dense confines 
of the city.  In 1872, investors Isaac Haas, Patterson Mitchell, William Dixon, and Gabriel 
Harman platted over 78 acres of Van Buren Township southeast of Dayton.11  Three years later, 
Gabriel Harman chartered the Oakwood Street Railway Company which extended horsecar 
service into Dayton’s southeastern countryside for the development of Oakwood.12 
 Oakwood remained a sparsely populated weekend retreat for wealthy Daytonians until 
the electrification of the streetcar allowed cities across the United States suburbanize at 
previously unforeseen rates.  In 1880, 70 percent of streetcars in the United States were 
horsecars, but by 1902, 97 percent of streetcars were electrified.13  According to historian 
Gwendolyn Wright: 
                                                      
9 United States Census Bureau, “Table 36. Ohio – Race and Hispanic Origin for Selected Large 
Cities and Other Places: Earliest Census to 1990,” 
www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/OHtab.pdf 
10 “History,” Greater Dayton Regional Transit Authority, www.i-riderta.org/about-rta/history  
11 Ibid. 
12 “Oakwood Historical Society Newsletter: Winter 2011,” The Oakwood Historical Society, 
(2011) : 1, www.oakwoodhistory.org/downloads/ohsnewswinter2011.pdf  
13 Miller, “Transportation Revolution and the Development of Oakwood, Ohio, 1870-1930,” 53. 
 Maani 13 
The suburbs of the 1870s had been contained by the public transportation networks of 
slow horsecars and infrequent, expensive railroads.  Then a real revolution in public 
transportation occurred… to compete with the electric streetcars, railway services opened 
up more lines and reduced fares.  Commuting was suddenly easier, faster, and less 
costly.14 
 
In 1888, the first electric streetcar in Dayton arrived, and it was known as the White Line Street 
Railroad.15  Railroad corporations quickly began extending electric streetcar lines into the 
countryside for the development of new neighborhoods, which the Cities quickly annexed to 
maintain municipal control and increase their tax base.  Dayton annexed many early streetcar 
suburbs such as Dayton View, Miami City, and Patterson the early-1880s shortly after they were 
built.16   
However, Oakwood avoided annexation when John H. Patterson threatened the City of 
Dayton with an ultimatum: allow Oakwood to municipally incorporate and provide improved 
streetcar access for NCR employees, or the company will relocate from Dayton.17  Patterson 
founded the National Cash Register Corporation in 1884 and made Oakwood the home of 
Dayton’s wealthiest residents, including his upper-management.  This caused Dayton to back 
down from their intentions to annex Oakwood, in order to preserve NCR’s presence in the urban 
core.  Therefore, on June 3, 1907, thirty-six of Oakwood’s leading businessmen signed and 
presented a petition for incorporation to the Board of Trustees of Van Buren Township.  The 
township voted in favor of incorporation and Oakwood became a village on January 9, 1908.18   
                                                      
14 Wright, Building the Dream, 104. 
15 Ibid, 49. 
16 Ronald and Ronald, The Lands Between the Miamis: A Bicentennial Celebration of the Dayton 
Area, 118-120. 
17 Miller, “Transportation Revolution and the Development of Oakwood, Ohio, 1870-1930,” 84-
85. 
18 Bruce W. and Virginia Ronald, Oakwood: The Far Hills (Reflections Press, 1983), 54. 
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The incorporation of Oakwood not only provided upper-class Daytonians with an enclave 
to invest their wealth through homeownership, but an aristocratic environment in which to 
seclude themselves with individuals of their strata.  Kenneth T. Jackson remarks: “The American 
nouveaux riches embraced the notion of conspicuous consumption in the form of ornamental real 
estate and decided that the most fashionable way to display great wealth was to invest in a rural 
estate of appropriately grand dimensions.”19  Historians Rosalyn Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen 
write that aristocratic lifestyles were a characteristic of early suburbs, specifically on Long 
Island, New York: 
The elites were determined no industrial development would mar their beaches, forests, 
hunting preserves, yachting, and county clubs.  Class conflict might be an unavoidable 
by-product of the industries these men owned, but life on the North Shore would bear no 
evidence of the industrial turmoil that financed it.  The North Shore let the industrial 
elites live out the fantasy of a leisured, preindustrial existence – albeit with all the modern 
conveniences money could buy.20 
 
One can see these attitudes among early residents of Oakwood, according to the suburb’s official 
history: “Recreation is an Oakwood tradition, too.  John Patterson’s Old Barn Club, in Hills and 
Dales, offered golf and tennis, concerts, dances, pool tables, playgrounds, wading pools, 
volleyball, dining, and even overnight stays – all for a nominal membership fee.”21  At the time, 
recreational activities were a luxury, used by the upper-class to distance themselves from the 
working-class.  
Furthermore, many Daytonians believed the bucolic atmosphere of Oakwood raised 
healthier and more moral families because of its rural location free from urban congestion and 
                                                      
19 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 88. 
20 Rosalyn Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen, Picture Windows: How The Suburbs Happened, 
(Basic Books, 2000), 6. 
21 The City of Oakwood, Oakwood: From Acorn to Oak Tree: A centennial Celebration 2008, 
(The City of Oakwood, 2008), 41. 
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slums.  Gwendolyn Wright claims that “those who moved to the new suburbs were assured of an 
escape from the problems of poor health, social unrest, and vice associated with urban life” while 
“the private dwelling in a safe residential neighborhood” protected whites from urban 
problems.22  Home developers in Oakwood advertised that one’s domestic environment directly 
influences the familial morals.  An advertisement for Oakwood’s Schantz Park Plat from 1915 
states that “Schantz Park is ideal for a home where the health and development of children is a 
factor.  A child that grows up in a Schantz Park home has the advantage of pure air and clean 
sunshine, and the delights of flowers, trees and growing things.  Great are the moral and physical 
benefits, to the little folk, of adequate playgrounds and scenic beauty.”23  In the late-nineteenth 
century, many sociologists argued that men were rugged and adept for the hardships of urban 
life, while women and children were delicate and belonged in the protective environment of a 
suburban home.  According to Wright: “Victorian ideology perceived women and children as 
especially close to nature, much more so than men, who could withstand the hard demands of 
supposedly unnatural city life – provided they had their retreats in the suburbs.”24  
Many white Americans often associated urban blight, crime, and poverty with the 
growing minority populations following the Civil War.  As Dayton industrialized, the city’s 
black population grew from 305 blacks in 1860 to 3,387 in 1900 primarily due African American 
migration from the south.25  Additionally, one-third of all Americans lived in cities in 1890, with 
two-thirds of urbanites being immigrants.26  Many whites blamed the urban crime and blight 
                                                      
22 Wright, Building the Dream, 96. 
23 “The Place to Live,” 1915 Schantz Estate Brochure, reprinted June 2006, The Oakwood 
Historical Society. 
24 Wright, Building the Dream, 75. 
25 United States Census Bureau, “Table 36. Ohio – Race and Hispanic Origin for Selected Large 
Cities and Other Places: Earliest Census to 1990.” 
26 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 68. 
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caused by urbanization on minorities, rather than these problems being a part of the overall 
process of industrialization, which added to their reasons for living in Oakwood.  Jackson writes 
that suburban homes “seemed immune to the dislocations of an industrializing society and cut off 
from the toil and turbulence of emerging immigrant ghettos.”27 
The Dayton Flood of 1913 devastated the city and destroyed the homes of many wealthy 
Daytonians, attracting many upper-class residents to Oakwood due to its elevation above sea 
level.  The flood damaged $100 million worth of property, displaced 65,000 Daytonians, and 
destroyed more than 1,000 homes.28  Oakwood’s official history claims that “in the years 
following the flood, Dayton’s wealthy moved to Oakwood, relocating on the hilly slopes west of 
Far Hills” due to the fact that Dayton elites previously had “their mansions were along the river 
on Dayton’s Monument Avenue or in the Riverdale section” before the flood.29  The Taylor-
Simpson Realty Company advertised their Oakwood developments as plats lying “high and dry 
on the Oakwood Hill” and “240 feet about Dayton’s business district where the air is fresh and 
pure and free from dust and smoke.”30  In 1910, there were only 67 homes in Oakwood.31  By 
1920, Oakwood’s population increased to 1,473 and by 1930, 6,494 residents lived there.32 
Oakwood’s mansions were out of reach for most Daytonians, since prior to the New 
Deal, most Americans did not own houses.  In this era, Americans could only become 
homeowners by one-of-two means: ether purchasing a home outright as banks provided poor 
mortgages or literally building a home themselves.  During the 1920s, one-third of the all 
                                                      
27 Ronald and Ronald, Oakwood, 71. 
28 Ibid. 
29 The City of Oakwood, Oakwood, 34. 
30 Ronald and Ronald, Oakwood, 117. 
31 Ronald and Ronald, The Lands Between the Miamis, 209. 
32 Ibid, 325. 
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Americans lived in substandard housing while at the same time mortgage debit tripled due to 
poor lending options.33  Most banks only covered 40 to 50 percent of the appraised value of 
homes while charging interest rates around 5 to 9 percent, repayable up to five years.34  
Therefore, few Daytonians could afford to move to Oakwood in the early-twentieth century and 
most residents rented urban dwellings.  Those who did own homes often paid high interest rates 
and fees. 
As a result, at the onset of the Great Depression, millions of unemployed Americans 
defaulted on their mortgages and homelessness became rampant with about 1,000 foreclosures 
per week by 1933.35  Fifteen million Americans were unemployed during the Great Depression, 
one-third of which worked in the construction industry.  In Ohio, 40 percent of factory workers 
and 67 percent of construction workers were unemployed by 1933.36  By 1934, there were 4,044 
vacant residences in Dayton, hundreds of which had no modern conveniences like electricity or 
plumbing.37  Moreover, while most families rented their homes for around $20 per month due to 
unemployment, the City of Dayton still had to pay in-full the rents of over 220 black families and 
487 white families.38  
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his allies in Congress knew unemployment and the 
housing crisis were two fundamentally inseparable economic challenges to address in the New 
Deal.  Therefore, FDR signed the Homeowners Refinancing Act of 1933 and the National 
                                                      
33 Wright, Building the Dream, 193. 
34 Ibid, 241. 
35 Ibid, 240. 
36 “Great Depression,” Ohio History Connection, 
www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Great_Depression  
37 Frank A. Caulkins, Progressive Ohioans and New Deal Housing Programs in Dayton 
(Professional Press, 2001), 22. 
38 Ibid, 22. 
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Housing Act of 1934, establishing the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and Federal Housing 
Administration.  From 1933 until its disbandment in 1951, the HOLC combated foreclosures by 
negotiating with banks for low-interest, fixed-rate government loans payable up to about twenty 
years.39  While the HOLC worked on the financial end preventing foreclosures, the FHA 
stimulated the construction industry through home construction, prioritizing detached homes in 
suburbia.40  According to Wright: “residential construction, together with real-estate investments, 
played key roles in the national economy” while at the same time the construction of “private 
homes encouraged individuality.”41   
The racial composition of neighborhoods and the age of buildings have long determined 
real estate values in American cities.  Jackson writes: “The HOLC simply applied these 
[existing] notions of ethnic and racial worth to real estate appraising on an unprecedented scale” 
and that “The damage caused by the HOLC came not through its own actions, but through the 
influence of its appraisal system on the financial decisions of other institutions.”42  HOLC 
appraisers produced Residential Security Maps which “red lined” neighborhoods based on age 
and racial demographics as a means of protecting property values, which real estate investors 
then used to make extrapolations on the property values and riskiness of specific neighborhoods.  
As a result, the HOLC policies divested in the rehabilitation of urban homes while 
simultaneously promoted white suburban homeownership, which resulted in the segregation of 
blacks to Dayton’s Westside.43 
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The HOLC color-coded Residential Security Maps on four-tier grading scale of A 
through D to determine residential values.  An A corresponded to homogeneously white 
neighborhoods with high potential and a D corresponded to older industrial as well as minority 
neighborhoods.  The introduction of one minority family into a neighborhood caused appraisers 
to re-label the area D or “hazardous,” even if the home was in excellent condition and the 
homeowner was within the community income bracket.  The Residential Security Map of Dayton 
from April of 1935 shows the areas classified as D lying on the historically black dominated 
Westside.  The peninsula formed from Clearwater River and Mad River was dotted with 
transitional areas as blacks moved into that enclave.44   
The FHA collaborated closely with the HOLC, using their Residential Security Maps to 
provide “unbiased professional estimates.”  Furthermore, the FHA used HOLC maps “to 
determine the degree of mortgage risk introduced in a mortgage insurance transaction because of 
the location of the property at a specific site.”45  An FHA appraiser from 1937 wrote about the 
favorable influences of an area of Oakwood ranked as an A: “Restricted – very high class 
residential – exceptionally good schools – parks – playgrounds – homogeneous as to 
development and character of property – transportation good – good fire and police protection.”46  
The appraiser goes on to notify investors whether there was an “infiltration” of “foreign-born” or 
“negro” peoples.  The FHA helped ensure sustainable white middle-class residential 
development while turning “the building industry against the minority and inner-city housing 
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market” and encouraging them to support policies of “income and racial segregation of 
suburbia.”47  
In addition to redlining, the FHA enforced and maintained racial segregation by 
accepting restrictive covenants as legal documents.  Between the 1920s and the 1940s, restrictive 
covenants were agreements embedded in the deed of a home as to which socioeconomic class of 
people their home may be sold to as a means of protecting property values.  The FHA’s 1934 
manual provides a model covenant as follows: “No persons of any race other than [race to be 
inserted] shall use or occupy any building or any lot, except that this covenant shall not prevent 
occupancy by domestic servants of a different race domiciled with an owner or tenant.”48 
Furthermore, the FHA prioritized lending towards the development of detached homes in 
suburbia and divested in older housing in the urban core.  Jackson claims that “FHA insurance 
went to new residential developments on the edges of metropolitan areas, to the neglect of core 
cities” because the FHA “favored the construction of single-family projects and discouraged 
construction of multi-family projects.”49  Additionally, “loans for the repair of existing structures 
were small and for short duration, which meant that a family could more easily purchase a new 
home than modernize an old one.”50  As a result, this perpetuated the concentration of many 
minorities and those too poor for homeownership into inner-city housing projects and rental 
properties.  In 1934, 16,887 white Daytonians owned homes and 26,002 rented, while 408 black 
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Daytonians owned homes and 3,453 rented.51  Although, the FHA quickly began promoting 
homeownership in Dayton, as it loaned $6 million between 1934 and 1939.52 
These federal agencies spurred limited growth, but as a result of the Second World War, 
suburbanization around Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton.  Upon the outbreak of the 
war, Dayton factories began supporting the war effort through munitions manufacturing.  
According to the Ohio History Connection: “Dayton benefited greatly from the growth of 
wartime industries during World War II and received approximately $1.7 billion in government 
defense contracts during the war.”53  On January 1, 1942, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
located in Fairborn received $17.5 million in federal funds to expand the base by 750 acres and 
construct a new Air Service Command headquarters.54  Throughout the war, Dayton 
manufacturing employed 46.3 percent of the city’s black population; 16.2 percent of whom were 
recent southern migrants.55  In 1942, the Dayton Public Welfare Office announced that while 
4,000 Daytonians were in search of a home, only 40 percent would be able to find one.56  The 
National Housing Agency (NHA) funded the construction of 1,500 family units and 125 
dormitories in 1942, followed by the construction of an additional 1,075 housing units in 1944.57  
Federal government constructed most of the wartime housing around WPAFB for workers.  
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WPAFB contracted Hebble Homes to construct subsidized wartime housing units in Fairborn for 
its workers.58  After the Second World War – as WPAFB became a major aeronautical research 
center for the United States Air Force and Dayton’s largest employer – the City of Fairborn to 
converted the wartime apartments into low-income housing.59 
Wartime housing was cheap and temporary, but numerous Daytonians still needed 
housing at war’s end.  FDR and Congress established the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 
through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill), with the anticipation of millions 
of returning servicemen after the Second World War.  A high percentage of Daytonians 
envisioned themselves living becoming homeowners after the war.  The NHA predicted that 20 
percent of families that stayed in Dayton after the war were expected to move from their present 
quarters after the war.60  Specifically, 5,700 families indicated that they expected to buy or build 
a new house, 4,800 families planned to buy an existing house, 5,000 wished to rent other 
quarters, and 10,100 families planned to move out of Dayton.61  Furthermore, according to the 
NHA “the median price which families who plan to buy or build a new home expect to pay is 
$6,630 with 13 percent expecting to pay less than $5,000; 17 percent from $5,000 to $5,999; 49 
percent from $6,000 to $7,999; and 21 percent indicated an intention of paying $8,000 or 
more.”62  Most FHA homes cost between $6,000 and $8,000, therefore, with the FHA debt 
ceiling at $20,000 and the average weekly income for Daytonians at $60 to $79, suburban 
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homeownership became more affordable than renting long-term.63  Furthermore, the VA allowed 
veterans to borrow the entire appraised value of a housing without a down payment.64  As a 
result – regardless of whether they supported racially segregated neighborhoods or not – white 
families moved to suburbia because the FHA provided them with the most affordable housing 
options. 
During the Postwar Era, businessmen took advantage of flexible FHA and VA mortgages 
and consumer demand by building mass-producing suburbs from the ground up.  Most notably, 
Levitt and Sons built Levittown on Long Island, New York between 1947 and 1951.  Wright 
argues that the Levitt Brothers “stayed with traditional styling but used modern construction 
techniques.”65  The Levitt Brothers built 17,450 homes for 75,000 residents in Levittown, Long 
Island between 1947 and 1951.66  Levitt and Sons tapped into the fears and insecurities of whites 
who lived through two world wars and the Great Depression, by advertising suburbia as a place 
of peace and security.  Wright states: “The arguments that brought them to the suburbs 
unilaterally condemned the city as a dangerous place for children and played on the insecurity of 
an entire generation of parents.”67  These perfectly manicured, mass-produced, and subdivided 
communities provided stability to many twentieth century families against the uncertainties of 
modern life. 
Home developer Charles C. Huber pursued a similar strategy as the Levitt Brothers near 
Dayton after the war.  Huber inherited 200 acres of Wayne Township from his father in 1954, 
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and in 1956, he began mass-producing modest homes primarily for military veterans and factory 
workers.68  He spent $750,000 to build Huber Utilities – the first privately licensed water and 
sewer treatment plant in Ohio – for the development of rural Wayne Township.69  Unlike the 
homes in Oakwood, Huber Homes never designed custom housing, rather the company stuck to 
their 1,000 to 1,400 square feet Cape Cod and Ranch styles which were notorious for mass-
produced brick façades.70  Wright writes: 
Prefabrication seemed a promising route toward lower costs and greater numbers of units.  
With government funding, new materials had been tried out during the war years and had 
proved successful: “stressed skin” plywood panels for walls, laminated wood roofs, 
welded-steel roof trusses, steel-frame wall panels with “clapboards” of painted 
aluminum, “predecorated” gypsum-board ceilings, were all produced in factories.71 
 
Despite mass-produced aesthetic, the name of “ranch” style homes evoked the bucolic imagery 
around the homes in older suburbs like Oakwood.72  Furthermore, all Huber Heights homes cost 
under $10,000, making them in reach for homebuyers with FHA assistance.73  Because the 
federal government prioritized funding for single-family detached homes, Huber Homes 
constructed more than 10,707 single-family homes, in addition to a mere 2,258 multi-family 
units, between 1956 and 1992.74 
The affordability of automobiles after the Second World War and the peripheral location 
of postwar suburbs along highways, helped end streetcar service in Dayton as well as force 
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suburbanites to rely on the automobile.  According to Jackson, the number of electric streetcars 
peaked in 1917 at 72,911 while total ridership crested in 1923 at 15.7 billion, while cars 
gradually became the preferred transit option of many Americans.75  Between 1910 and 1927, the 
number of automobile repair shops in Dayton had increased from 20 to 78, with over 40,000 
automobiles registered in Dayton.76  The Dayton City Plan Board noted this change in 1934 and 
observed: “It is, therefore, clearly evident that any growth that the city showed in the past ten 
years was gained almost entirely by annexation.  Unquestionably, in this respect, the automobile 
and the advanced sub-division design were among the most important factors which brought this 
transition about.”77  The lack of trolley ridership in Dayton, in particular, pressured the City 
Transit Company of Dayton in September of 1947 to replace end streetcar services.78   
This shift from mass-transit to private automobile ownership grew enormously in the 
1950s.  President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Congress enacted the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956 establishing the construction of a 41,000 mile interstate highway system to make 
automobile travel more efficient.  Two interstate highways in this era intersected near Dayton: I-
75 which stretches from Michigan to Florida and I-70 which spans territory from Utah to 
Maryland.  Huber Heights was one of the first suburbs in Dayton to take advantage of the 
Interstate Highway System to promote suburban development.  Huber Heights developed in a 
triangle shape surrounded by Interstate 70 to its north, Interstate 75 to its west, and Ohio State 
Route 4 to its east. 
                                                      
75 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 171. 
76 Miller, “Transportation Revolution and the Development of Oakwood, Ohio, 1870-1930,” 61. 
77 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 171. 
78 “History,” Greater Dayton Regional Transit Authority, http://www.i-riderta.org/about-
rta/history  
 Maani 26 
Unlike streetcars, which dictated the routes suburbanites could travel, automobiles 
liberated suburbanites from reliance on the central business district.  At the same time, 
metropolitan residents became increasingly reliant on automobiles as not only residential areas, 
but business and industry relocated to peripheral locations.  Huber Heights consequently grew 
from 1,921 residents in 1950 to 12,022 by 1960 and nearly 28,000 by 1970, primarily as a result 
of the construction of I-70 through the suburb.79  Since the incorporation of Huber Heights, its 
logistical position along I-70 helped to attract numerous businesses to relocate to the 
municipality including FedEx, Coca-Cola, and Yellow Freights.80  Today Huber Heights is home 
to over 40,000 suburbanites.81   
To many Daytonians, a sense of normalcy revolves around the fact that most white 
middle-class Daytonians live in suburbs accessible by automobile while many low-income 
minorities live in the inner-city and rely on public transportation.  However, Americans suburbs 
were not always havens for middle-class automobile owners.  This structure to American suburbs 
is a more recent creation of the twentieth century.  From Dayton’s founding in 1796 until its 
industrialization in the mid-nineteenth century, with public transportation yet to be invented, the 
density of Dayton caused residents to live in dense urban dwellings and to access the central 
business district by foot.  At the turn of the nineteenth century, early streetcar suburbs like 
Oakwood represented the aristocratic lifestyles of Dayton industrialists – including many from 
the National Cash Register Corporation – through their mansions and summer estates.  While 
today many Dayton suburbanites view public transportation with disdain and associate it with 
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low-income urbanites, through the early-twentieth century, even the wealthiest of Daytonians 
traveled by and relied on streetcars.  Additionally, factors including the bucolic atmosphere free 
from pollution and urban congestion as well as racial segregation helped promote living in 
Oakwood over urban neighborhoods.  Due to poor mortgage options prior to the New Deal and 
restrictive covenants, Oakwood was inaccessible to a majority of Daytonians in the early-
twentieth century.  While Dayton segregated neighborhoods before the New Deal – unlike today 
in which segregation takes on a greater distance between suburbs and the urban core – 
Daytonians of different racial and ethnic backgrounds lived in relatively close proximity to each 
other, as streetcars connected all neighborhoods to downtown. 
Soon after the Dayton Flood of 1913 leveled much of Dayton’s infrastructure, the onset 
of the Great Depression brought about high unemployment and homelessness, which helped 
create slums and homelessness within Dayton.  Contrastingly to today, most Daytonians rented 
their dwellings as homeownership was unaffordable.  Numerous Daytonians lived in poor 
conditions and had no other options until federal policy under the New Deal allowed for mass-
suburbanization.  In an effort to bring housing to the masses, the New Deal established the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, which prioritized mortgages 
for the construction of detached homes in suburbia over the rehabilitation of older homes in the 
urban core.  At the same time, these federal agencies based real estate values on both the age and 
racial compositions of neighborhoods.  As a result, white middle-class Daytonians moved to 
suburbia because of its affordability, which consequentially segregated blacks to Dayton’s older 
housing on the Westside. 
During the Second World War, many Daytonians lived in poor conditions or temporary 
housing, as resources went towards the war effort.  Munitions manufacturing was the primary 
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means of employment at the time in Dayton, therefore, these housing conditions were the only 
options for most people.  However, at war’s end, the policies of the HOLC, the FHA, and the VA 
allowed whites to escape the conditions of urban congestion and poverty.  In 1956, Charles C. 
Huber took advantage of the housing shortage and built Huber Heights from scratch by mass-
producing affordable homes for the working-class and veterans.  The federal government’s 
response to the postwar housing need by promoting new suburban development over 
rehabilitating existing neighborhoods caused emerging suburbs like Huber Heights to rely on 
automobiles for transportation.  As a result of the Interstate Highway Act, Huber Heights grew 
around I-70, which attracted business and industry to relocate from former industrial locations.  
which made it more difficult for urbanites without an automobile to find employment.  
These factors allowed suburbs to develop further from downtown, bringing an end to the 
electric streetcar in Dayton.  This left other kinds of less reliable public transportation as the 









 Part II 
In September of 1966, Dayton, Ohio experienced a racially charged urban riot on the 
city’s predominantly black Westside.  Many white suburbanites were taken aback by the riots 
and exclaimed “How could this happen in a city like Dayton?” and feared that social unrest 
would spread to white neighborhoods.  Many whites attributed the conditions which led to the 
Dayton Riot of 1966 with character flaws and poor housing choices within the black community.  
However, there were three main contributing factors which laid the foundation for the Dayton 
Riot of 1966 including housing discrimination, unemployment, police brutality, and the failure of 
Dayton-based War on Poverty agencies. 
Throughout the early-twentieth century, both restrictive covenants and the housing 
polices of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, the Federal Housing Administration, and the 
Veteran’s Administration promoted suburban homeownership and racial segregation.  These 
federal agencies divested in the urban core while prioritizing the growth of Dayton’s eastern 
suburbs around Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and Wright State University.  As 
manufacturing jobs left the urban core throughout the mid-twentieth century, some of the only 
employment opportunities for Daytonians were around WPAFB and WSU.  Beginning in the 
mid-1950s, the City of Dayton decided to displace of hundreds of black residents to construct I-
75 through the Westside.  The city also outsourced law enforcement jobs to white suburbanites, 
which spurred instances of police brutality.  By the mid-1960s, the Supporting Committee on 
Preventative Effort and Moving Ahead Together – a coalition of civil rights organizations which 
received federal dollars from the Office of Economic Opportunity during the War on Poverty – 
attempted to address these socioeconomic problems on Dayton’s Westside.  However, inter-
organizational conflicts over how to allocate federal dollars caused many black Daytonians to 
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view the civil rights organizations as overly bureaucratic and ineffective, helping to push some 
Westside residents towards more kinds of protest.  After the murder of an unarmed black man 
named Lester Mitchell, the combined effects these socioeconomic realities helped to ignite the 
Dayton Riot of 1966.   
Between the First World War and the Second World War, high unemployment during the 
Great Depression and wartime manufacturing jobs attracted southern African Americans 
migrants to northern industrial cities like Dayton in unprecedented numbers.  Between 1920 and 
1940, Dayton’s black population increased from 9,025 to 20,273 residents.1  Even before the 
establishment of the HOLC or the FHA, white Daytonians segregated blacks west of the Great 
Miami River.  Real estate agents enforced racial segregation primarily through the use of 
restrictive covenants, which were documents imbedded into the deeds of homes restricting the 
sale of the home to “undesirable” populations.2  Local residents also took initiative in 
maintaining racial segregation.  The Baltimore Afro-American reported in July of 1927 that white 
Daytonians rallied and protested the “black encroachment” occurring in their neighborhood.  The 
newspaper contended that whites were infuriated because they had made agreements with banks 
“to refuse to loan money on property bought by colored people.”3  One man at the rally 
exclaimed that “negroes” moving into white communities should be “shot” and “whipped” like 
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horses.4  Additionally, another man stated that “If a few niggers get a good sound beating they 
will know their places.”5 
Racial segregation was commonplace in Dayton even before the creation of the HOLC or 
the FHA due to these restrictive covenants and violence.  In 1934, the Civil Works 
Administration (CWA) studied the effects of restrictive covenants and racial steering on Dayton 
neighborhoods.  Historian Frank A. Kaulkins argues that the CWA’s findings were a “wakeup 
call with racial overtones” which showed “a strong correlation between slum areas and racial 
settlement patterns.”6  Kaulkins notes that there was a “growing concentration of black families 
immediately west of the center of the city.”7  Additionally, the Dayton Urban League remarked 
in 1945: 
The housing situation in Dayton for Negroes was serious prior to 1940.  The new 
demands for war workers has make it acute.  Residential segregation, restrictive housing 
covenants, overcrowding, and unfavorable neighborhood conditions are forces affecting 
the Negro in relation to housing.  Though many of the poor white migrants live under 
adverse conditions, they are able to improve their situation when they arrive at economic 
sufficiency.  The Negro, on the other hand, regardless of his improved condition is frozen 
in blighted areas and substandard houses solely on account of racial identity.8 
 
Therefore, the establishment of the HOLC and the FHA during the New Deal simply reinforced 
these notions of race and property value on a federal level.  To this point, when white Daytonians 
– whether purposefully or not – bought homes in suburbia through the FHA during the New Deal 
Era, they helped to segregate the city.  Historian Kenneth T. Jackson states that “The result, if 
not the intent, of the public housing program of the United States was to segregate the races, to 
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concentrate the disadvantaged in inner cities, and to reinforce the image of suburbia as a place of 
refuge for the problems of race, crime, and poverty.”9   
The federal government created low-income public housing as a form of social safety net 
housing for Americans unable to meet the requirements of HOLC or FHA mortgages.  Due to the 
fact that race underpinned many New Deal housing policies, these programs also automatically 
barred blacks and other minorities from homeownership in new suburban neighborhoods.  In 
Dayton, these policies caused a concentration of blacks on the city’s Westside.  Established in 
1933, the Public Works Administration not only stimulated the construction industry, but built 
low-income public housing.  This was critical due to the fact that of the fifteen million 
unemployed Americans during the Great Depression, a third worked in the construction 
industry.10  According to Wright: “Within a year [1934], the PWA itself began to buy land, raze 
slums, and build housing.  Over the next four years, it was responsible for destroying more than 
ten thousand substandard housing units and erecting almost twenty-two thousand new units in 
fifty-nine projects.”11  In 1933, the PWA granted construction jobs to 5,000 unemployed 
Daytonians on public relief, and subsidized $2,280,835 in labor costs and $178,000 in materials 
in an effort to boost Dayton’s economy.  In 1939, the PWA funded $16,000,000 towards the 
construct of WPAFB and housing for wartime workers.12 
The United States Housing Act of 1937 replaced the PWA with the United States 
Housing Authority (USHA), making the government almost entirely responsible for the 
construction of subsidized low-income housing.  The USHA lent up to 90 percent of the 
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construction costs of a housing project through local housing agencies.13  In 1940, the Dayton 
Metropolitan Housing Authority applied for $960,000 in federal funding to build the city’s first 
public housing project named DeSoto Bass Courts.  Although urban planners designed this 
project during the Great Depression exclusively for black families, it was initially used for both 
white and black wartime workers during the Second World War.  The federal government 
funded the rapid expansion of DeSoto Bass Courts during the war to 1,005 housing units with the 
prioritization of wartime workers.14  Due to the addition of middle-class workers to the project, 
the average family had a weekly income of $16.33 and paid a monthly rent of $12.72.15  
Therefore, when middle-class residents left at war’s end, black residents could no longer afford 
to maintain the project alone, considering rent was around $10 on the Westside.16 
Although public housing projects began during the Great Depression, their presence 
rapidly increased in American cities such as Dayton after the Housing Act of 1949.  This act 
allowed third party investors and municipalities conducting urban renewal projects to demolish 
neighborhoods categorized as “blighted.”  The USHA stipulated that if investors cleared slums 
and built low-income housing, the federal government would subsidize two-thirds of the 
construction costs.17  Investors built high-rise projects, consolidating space for other urban 
development projects.  Because the Housing Act of 1949 only required neighborhoods to be 20 
percent “blighted” in order to receive federal subsidies, cities haphazardly bulldozed numerous 
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minority and immigrant neighborhoods for the construction of new hospitals, sports arenas, and 
convention centers.18 
A critical component to public housing was the fact that it was voluntary and required 
municipalities to establish housing agencies in order receive federal funding.  Historian Kenneth 
T. Jackson states that “Because municipalities had discretion on where and when to build public 
housing, the projects invariably reinforced racial segregation.  A suburb that did not wish to 
tarnish its exclusive image by having public housing within its precincts could simply refuse to 
create a housing agency.”19  As a result, public housing concentrated in the urban core as many 
suburbs saw it as burden on their tax base, leaving few housing options for low-income 
minorities.20   
The Haymarket District and the West Dayton suffered from a lack of funding and 
housing grew increasingly overcrowded and dilapidated, especially as more southern African 
Americans continued to migrate to Dayton.  By 1950, 4,480 black Daytonians lived in 
overcrowded conditions.21  The Chicago Defender reported that between 1950 and 1955, new 
housing for black Daytonians increased by 4 percent while the black population increased about 
23 percent, yet only 1,070 out of 26,247 housing units built during this time were made available 
to blacks.22  In 1961, president of the West Dayton Area Council Don Ellis expressed to the 
Dayton Daily News: “More southern Negroes are arriving every day.  The last census showed 
only 14,000 housing units available for 58,000 Negroes in Dayton, less than one room per 
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person.  Families are growing, too.  We need housing to buy, not rent.  We need it now.”23   
Between 1950 and 1970, Dayton’s black population increased from 34,151 to 72,284, or 14 
percent to 30.5 percent of the Dayton’s total population.24  The President of the Edgemont 
Improvement Association – a community action organization –  Mrs. Clarissa Mukes stated that 
“People in Edgemont have no place to relocate to.  They can’t afford to buy houses.  They are 
low income people.  Few can qualify for FHA relocation loans.  These people have nowhere else 
to go.”25   
In 1956, the City of Dayton began several urban renewal projects, including the West 
Dayton renewal project.  At the time, nearly 3,600 acres – or one-sixth – of Dayton qualified as 
“blighted.”26  Another estimate approximates 60 percent of Dayton was blighted to some 
degree.27  The West Dayton project covered over 1,000 acres and displaced 500 black families 
due to the construction of Interstate 75.  Some black families attempted to move into white 
neighborhoods, but faced heavy resistance.  On September 26, 1963, a black masonry contractor 
named James Fuller, along with his wife and three kids, moved into the all-white neighborhood 
of Townview.  As a result, around 100 whites rioted outside Fuller’s house, throwing rocks, 
bottles, and eggs while chanting “Two, four, six, eight, run the niggers out of state!”  The Dayton 
Police Department had to call in 100 riot-trained police officers to break up the mob.28  In 1961, 
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the Dayton Urban League reported on the effect racial integration had on the neighborhood of 
Westwood: 
Housing for Dayton’s expanding Negro population is following a traditional pattern – the 
construction of new homes on open land in/or adjacent to the existing Negro community, 
and the movement of Negro families into adjacent neighborhoods formerly occupied by 
white people.  For instance, in 1956 we reported that the movement of Negroes into the 
Westwood area precipitated anger, frustration, and panic.  Nevertheless, the movement 
has continued.  In 1950 the Negro population in the Westwood area was ½ of 1%.  The 
1960 census shows that the Negro population in the Westwood area is now 60.2%.29  
 
Despite white resistance which made it difficult for blacks to leave the Westside, numerous black 
families moved to adjacent Jefferson Township, because it was sparsely inhabited farmland.  
Furthermore, between 1956 and 1960, 15,046 homes were constructed in the Dayton 
metropolitan area, only 2,523 of which were within Dayton’s municipal boundaries.30  Between 
1950 and 1960, Dayton’s black population only increased by 0.6 percent, representative of the 
migration into Jefferson Township, which in 1960 was 40% black.31  Despite the migration to 
Jefferson Township, around 90 percent of Dayton’s black population remained on the Westside 
during the 1960s.32 
 Throughout the Civil Rights Movement in the North, the fight to end residential 
segregation directly related to the fight for jobs.  Up until the 1964 Civil Rights Act provided 
blacks legislative means to combat discrimination, most business, restaurants, and public 
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institutions in Dayton refused to not hire or cater to blacks.33  In Dayton, local civil rights 
organizations fought to desegregate Rike’s Department Store and the Roosevelt High School 
public swimming pool.  The Dayton Urban League stated: “The denial of service to Negroes in 
most downtown restaurants, their exclusion from equal use of swimming facilities in some of the 
high schools are typical situations which are fraught with emotion and conflict.”34   
After the Second World War, manufacturing jobs relocated from the urban cores to new 
locations in suburbia and the American south and increasingly became more automated.  This 
made it much harder for low-income urbanites, many of whom were black, to find employment.  
Historian Greta de Jong writes: “Corporations’ ability to leave if conditions were not to their 
liking undermined the power of labor unions and discouraged governments from implementing 
policies opposed by business leaders, such as higher taxes or more generous social services.”35  
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, numerous Dayton-based corporations relocated.  Joseph 
Watras remarks that between 1960 and 1980, Dayton’s population dropped by 70,000 residents 
due to the relocation of corporations including Frigidaire, Dayton Tire, and NCR.36  During the 
1960s, blue collar employment became scarce as 15,000 manufacturing jobs had left NCR.37  
Therefore, as fewer jobs became available in the urban core at corporations like NCR, many of 
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the available jobs were further away at WPAFB.  These factors made it difficult for low-income 
urbanites reliant on public transportation to reach a job in the suburbs.   
 After the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Dayton-based corporations like NCR 
attempted to implement policies that signified that they were Equal Opportunity Employers.  A 
document from NCR in 1965 stated the corporation’s intent to find more minorities to fill its 
white-collar positions: “It is imperative that all units of this company… take affirmative action, 
immediately and on sustained basis, to acquire suitable minority-group employees.”38  NCR 
acknowledged the difficulty in finding qualified candidates saying that “the qualifications for 
salesmen and servicemen are high.  Obtaining people from a minority group already beset with 
educational and aptitude deficiencies will be difficult.”39  Even when Dayton companies were 
willing to hiring minorities, the conditions on the Westside frequently produced unqualified 
candidates.  The fact that only 32 percent of black Daytonians held a high school diploma during 
the 1960s also influenced their prospects.40  Dayton’s Community Research, Inc. reported that 
although blacks made up 10 percent of Dayton’s labor force, and no more than 20 percent of the 
city’s population, they accounted for over 33 percent of Dayton’s unemployed in 1965.41 
The endemic unemployment among black Americans and pressure from civil rights 
organizations helped push the federal government towards legislative intervention.  On January 
8, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson declared in his first State of the Union Address: “The 
administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America.”42  The 
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Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (War on Poverty) focused on urban black and Latino 
communities through “a joint Federal-local effort.”43  The War on Poverty provided $800 million 
its first year on job training, economic development programs, and improving social services.44   
The two main War on Poverty organizations in Dayton were the Supporting Committee 
on Preventative Effort, established in 1964, and Moving Ahead Together, established in 1965.  
However, in the mid-1960s, federal officials threatened to deny MAT its federal dollars funding 
unless they removed its director Albert Holland for his “controversial” tactics.45  In her 1967 
undergraduate thesis A Descriptive Study of the Civil Disturbance in Dayton, Ohio, Mary 
Ritchey writes that “MAT has been the most controversial of the anti-poverty projects and one of 
the least understood.  During its one and one-half year running feud with the community and the 
status quo it has attacked real estate, schools, and newspaper and welfare interests.”46  Tension 
arose between MAT and SCOPE due to a War on Poverty policy requiring MAT apply and 
receive federal funds through SCOPE.  Holland viewed the policies of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity as individual organizations form and apply for funding of their own projects, and he 
did not agree with the new bureaucracy.  Holland and supporters viewed SCOPE as promoting 
the liberal “establishment” and declared they “won’t be ruled by the people downtown.”47 
This inter-organizational conflict created a rift in both the Dayton Civil Rights Movement 
and the city’s black community.  Many supporters of SCOPE criticized MAT for its “lack of 
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administrative skill” and that it needed “more effective community organization,” while others 
saw the conflict as part of the bureaucratic structure of federal programs.48  The controversial 
tactics which brought about the call for Holland’s resignation were seen as inefficient and 
aimless by manly black Daytonians.  A woman cried out at a community meeting: “I’m asking 
Mr. Holland. Have you considered the poor people?  If Mr. Holland cares about West Dayton 
and the poor, let him step down.”49  Although SCOPE had funding at their fingertips, political 
disagreements over the implementation of funding led to few effective job training programs.   
The inter-organizational conflicts between SCOPE and MAT brought few job training 
programs to Dayton’s Westside.  Most notably in January of 1966, when SCOPE entered Dayton 
in the running to participate in LBJ’s Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC).  However, as had been 
commonplace within Dayton civil rights groups, federal antipoverty officials, Dayton Urban 
League officials, as well as SCOPE and MAT, disagreed over bureaucratic details over Dayton’s 
participation in NYC.  The NYC would have provided SCOPE with $87,000 in job training 
services as well as counselling for high school dropouts on Dayton’s Westside.   
By the late-1960s, housing discrimination, high unemployment, and the inability of civil 
rights groups like SCOPE and MAT to relieve the socioeconomic pressures helped turn many 
black Americans towards more radical solutions.  Throughout the United States at this time, only 
46 percent of northern blacks saw state governments as “helpful” and only about one-third saw 
local governments as their “allies.”50  Throughout the late-1960s, urban riots – more often than 
not –ignited due to officer involved shootings.  Historian Thomas J. Sugrue argues that riots 
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“followed a pattern that would become commonplace during the mid-1960s – beginning with a 
police incident, ending with angry crowds in the streets.”51   
Within a short period during the late-1960s, the United States witnessed urban riots 
across from Newark to Los Angeles, including Dayton.  Historian Thomas J. Sugrue argues that 
the greatest problem northern police departments faced was the lack of black officers and high 
rates of police brutality.  Sugrue writes: “The fact that northern police departments were nearly 
all white through the early 1960s did little to inspire blacks’ confidence in their unbiased 
enforcement of the law… many police departments professionalized, eliminated residency 
requirements, and recruited in suburbs… the result was a racial gap.” 
Therefore, after the murder of a black man named Lester Mitchell on September 1, 1966, 
rumors spread like wildfire throughout the Westside that it was an officer involved shooting, 
quickly escalating racial tensions.  Although no officers had been involved, many black residents 
already held animosities towards the Dayton Police Department (DPD).  In 1966, only 13 black 
officers served in the DPD out of 378 white officers, whom were known to refer to black 
residents as “boy” and “nigger.”52  The riot, in part, formed rapidly from spreading rumors about 
it being an officer involved shooting.  Anger and frustration grew as the crowd of onlookers 
transformed into a mob of rioters.  Emergency units took their time arriving at Mitchell’s home 
and local residents yelled “Do something!  You pigs wouldn’t let a white man lay here like 
this!”53  Although Lester Mitchell did not die until 7:55 p.m., riots already spread along a thirty-
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block stretch of Third Street which crosses into East Dayton.54  Several hours before Mitchell’s 
death at 12:30 p.m., the situation escalated to the point at which Ohio Governor Jim Rhodes 
deployed several Ohio Army National Guard Units into the Westside, with over 525 police 
officers and National Guardsmen deployed during the riot’s height.  When the riots subsided 
after three days, Governor Rhodes withdrew the National Guard, with over 175 people arrested.55 
While the Black Power Movement may have influenced the riots to an extent, many 
mainstream media sources overly attributed the riots to organized efforts by groups such as the 
Black Panther Party.  While many black leftists argued the urban riots were the beginnings of 
revolutions, many whites believed the radical rhetoric and argued the coinciding urban riots were 
planned assaults on America, rather than backlashes against systemic racism.  According to 
Sugrue: “many whites, particularly law enforcement officers and elected officials, took black 
radicals at their word.  They viewed the riots as products of a conspiracy, hatched by the cells of 
black militants who hoped for nothing short of overthrowing the white power structure.  But 
there was little evidence that the urban rebellions of the 1960s were planned, coordinated, and 
controlled.56  On June 12, 1967, Dayton civil rights leader W. S. McIntosh of Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE), along with H. Rap Brown of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), held a rally against employment discrimination at the Wesley Center on the 
Westside.57  Following the rally, another urban riot broke out, which many contributed to a 
coordinated effort by McIntosh and Brown.  Brown stated to Dayton Daily News that “We’re 
here to make white men get on their knees.”58  Additionally, Brown refuted peaceful rhetoric by 
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telling Westside residents “Nothing killed a nigger like too much love…. be non-violent against 
each other, but non-violence is not the way to deal with whites.”59  Many Daytonians contributed 
these radical statements as responsible for the riots, despite the fact that CORE and SNCC had 
no coordinated plans. 
While Dayton newspapers focused on attacks against white pedestrians, helping to create 
panic within white neighborhoods, most rioters only targeted those who they blamed for 
problems on Dayton’s Westside.  According to Sugrue: “Rioters chose their targets carefully, 
and had just two: the police and shopkeepers.  They rarely looted segregated schools or attacked 
white churches.  They did not march on corporate headquarters or break into office buildings, 
even though most northern downtowns were within easy reach.”60  In Dayton – outside of 
clashes with the police – many blacks directed their anger at the white shopkeepers who barred 
them from jobs and took advantage of their community.  One black Westside resident stated: 
“You should see what they [whites] sell to Negroes, it is not fit for dogs to eat” in addition to 
how white business owners refused to hire local black residents.61  At the same time, many 
rioters purposefully placed signs which read “soul brother” in front of white businesses which 
respected the black community.  Although rioters directed their anger at police and shopkeepers, 
newspapers helped to solidify fears whites may have had about blacks. 
Despite the fact that black rioters in the late-1960s more often than not only targeted 
police and shopkeepers, many whites feared for the destruction of their neighborhoods and 
personal safety.62  A Dayton Daily News article headlined “IN W. THIRD ST. ALLEY: ‘Nice, 
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Gentle Old Man’ Beaten by Youths.”63  News reports also heavily focused on specific instances 
of attacks against white people.  Lester Kroogler testified to Dayton Daily News: 
When the light changed, I started to move and a brick came through the right side and hit 
me right here [pointing to his jaw], and bounced over and struck me on the arm.  Boy he 
really heaved it.  They were just a bunch of teenagers… just teenagers.  But I wasn’t 
going to stop.  I just kept creeping along and took the trailer right into the terminal.  If I 
didn’t they would have killed me.64 
 
The Journal Herald reported that Oakwood and Kettering police departments could assure 
suburbanites that they were “prepared” to protect their suburbs with “every available man on 
duty.”65   
The news coverage of rioters attacking whites helped cause some whites to take 
defensive measures.  In his book Blood in the Streets, former police officer Daniel L. Baker 
recalls how “Carloads of white youths became vigilantes and scoured for blacks who might cross 
the river.  Some adults who openly brandished shotguns, rifles and handguns on the streets were 
arrested.”66  Furthermore, officer Baker remarks that some whites feared black rioters spilling 
into their communities via public transportation. 
Cities and townships that surrounded Dayton took action to seal their borders.  White 
upscale cities like Oakwood and Kettering made sure the “colored problem” did not spill 
over into their area.  Roadblocks were set up and heavily staffed with armed officers who 
checked all cars that contained Negros.  A few yellow and black City Transit buses that 
ran the routes were checked when they entered suburban enclaves.67 
 
Despite the reports of white Daytonians being attacked, no black rioters entered into white 
communities during the Dayton Riot of 1966. 
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Following the Dayton Riot of 1966, many white Daytonians saw the riots as separate and 
unrelated to the history of suburbia, attributing it to the coordinated efforts of Black Power 
activists.  One white woman after stated: “What a terrible thing to have happen in Dayton! …I 
just can’t believe the shooting was done by Dayton people!  It looks to me like it was planned, by 
outsiders.”68  The destruction and looting on the Westside not only scared many whites, but 
reinforced notions some whites held about black culture and justified their reasons for living in 
suburbia.  Two months after the initial riot, a Dayton Daily News reporter wrote that the black 
Westside resident “does not know how to make use of the freedom he has.  He makes many mis-
steps, stumbles often, experiences great difficulty in achievement.  He feels somehow, he is not 
quite to blame for his troubles.  Like all human beings, he seeks to place the burden 
elsewhere.”69  Another one white reporter sarcastically wrote: “BUT THE ROOT cause of urban 
unrest, everyone knows, is unemployment and its obviously antidote is to create jobs for men too 
ignorant and untrained to respond to opportunities offered in the want ad columns.”70  A Dayton 
Express journalist reported: “One day soon, I hope the Negro will wake up to realize that the 
enemy is himself.  That he can now divert his energies from striking out at the white world and 
start rectifying his own shortcomings that definitely are within his ability to rectify.”71   
The greatest consequence of the Dayton Riot of 1966 was further abandonment of the 
central business district by the middle-class.  In reference to increased insurance rates after the 
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riot, a president of one Dayton manufacturing firm said: “Anyone that isn’t thinking that rates 
won’t go up is crazy.  You don’t even have to be smart to figure that out.”72  Furthermore, 
newspapers reported that for each day of rioting, the State of Ohio used $10,000 worth of Ohio 
taxpayer dollars to fund the National Guard while the City of Dayton used $4,500 worth of local 
taxpayer dollars.73  This helped encourage many businesses and residents to move to suburbia, 
where their properties would be better protected and they would not pay taxes that they believed 
would contribute to urban riots. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, restrictive covenants, discriminatory New 
Deal housing policies, as well as racial steering segregated Dayton.  The construction of 
Interstate 75 displaced black Westside residents and relocated jobs to the suburban periphery, 
making it harder for low-income minorities to find jobs.  Despite the reality that these factors led 
to the Dayton Riot of 1966, many white Daytonians viewed the riots as a result of coordinated 
efforts by black radicals to destroy the Dayton community.  The fact that many white Daytonians 
did not view the riots as correlated with the history of segregation, unemployment, police 
brutality, and urban renewal, helped cause them to view the socioeconomic conditions and 
rioting on the Westside as a result of character flaws and poor housing decisions. Furthermore, 
many whites viewed all blacks as living on the Westside and involved with the riots, despite the 
fact that a high percentage of Dayton area blacks lived in Jefferson Township and not on the 
inner-Westside.  The Dayton Riot of 1966 stigmatized Dayton’s urban core as being a place 
filled with dangerous criminals, helping to cause whites and businesses to relocate to suburbia.  
Additionally, after the nationwide urban riots during the 1960s, many suburban communities like 
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Beavercreek fought for incorporation in order to control their tax base, attract businesses, and 
subsidize public schools.  As a result of mass-suburban – whether deliberate or not – has been 
the migration of the middle-class tax base from the urban core, while making it more difficult for 





















From 2010 through 2013, the Beavercreek City Council argued it was protecting the 
interest of its community by barring public transportation, due to concerns over public safety.  
Many suburban residents argued that public transportation did not belong in their community, as 
if its natural place was only in cities, and cited racially coded concerns over public safety.  While 
the Beavercreek City Council believed it was objectively protecting the suburb’s interests, the 
busing controversy brought to light how the fears many whites have of Dayton’s Westside 
continues to perpetuate inequalities.  The busing controversy grew out of a longer history of 
white suburbanites trying to protect what they saw as their self-interest. 
Beavercreek’s segregationist history began with its campaign for incorporation in the 
late-twentieth century.  Between 1964 and 1980, the Committee of Eleven – a group of local 
property owners and businesses in Beavercreek Committee of Eleven – fought for incorporation 
in order to preserve lower taxes, avoid school desegregation, and remain safe from urban rioters.  
In 1986, the opening of Interstate 675 East in 1986 helped cause the construction of The Mall at 
Fairfield Commons near the interstate corridor.  Due to the fact that many whites complained 
about black youth traveling by public transportation and causing trouble at Dayton Mall, the City 
of Beavercreek never brought public transportation to their new mall.  As jobs increasingly left 
the urban core for The Mall at Fairfield Commons, urbanites had to trek 1.5 miles over I-675 
from Fairborn to reach the mall.  In 2011, Advocates for Basic Legal Equity, Inc. (ABLE) 
accused the Beavercreek City Council of violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by 
barring a minority-majority ridership from using RTA services along federally funded highways 
in Beavercreek.  The FHWA threated to halt funding to Beavercreek because their refusal 
prevented RTA’s ridership from reaching the mall along federally funded highways, forcing the 
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City of Beavercreek to install the bus stops in 2014.  Whether or not Beavercreek residents 
intended to deliberately discriminate against urban minorities, their efforts to separate their 
wealth and resources from the rest of the Dayton Metropolitan Area have arisen out of a belief 
that their only solution to urban problems was segregation. 
After the Second World War, the sparsely inhabited farmland around Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base began to develop into the suburbs of Fairborn and Beavercreek.  When the City 
of Fairborn incorporated in 1950, it had a population around 12,000, which tripled by 1970.1  
One factor around the growth of Fairborn was the investments made by the United States Air 
Force at WPAFB, including the 1956 plan to relocate USAF Air Research and Development 
Command from Baltimore, Maryland to Fairborn in addition to constructing a $6 million 
building.2  The demographics of Fairborn were primarily working-class, in addition to a 
significant black population relative to most peripheral communities during the Postwar Era.  In 
her 1956 Master’s thesis A History of Fairborn, Ohio, Mary P. Poole describes the suburb’s 
dwellings as “attractive, modest single dwellings through multiple unit developments such as 
Hebble Homes and Krumm Plat to more pretentious homes”3  Fairborn had a variety of 
dwellings as a result of the varied of economic statuses of employees at WPAFB. 
By 1950, Beavercreek Township had a population of 5,327 residents which increased to 
16,680 by 1960.4  By the early-1960s, Beavercreek Township homes consisted almost entirely of 
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single-family units, reflective of its more affluent strata.  A 1962 report from Miami University 
stated: 
The predominate type of dwelling in the township is the single family dwelling.  These 
were previously farm houses, but now the residential development is the primary housing 
form.  Houses in these suburban communities are of frame construction and often have a 
brick veneer on ½ acre lots.  Throughout the township yards and houses are well 
maintained and kept in a neat and clean fashion.  The general feeling of prosperity exists 
throughout the township… almost all the homes are single-story, ranch-type buildings of 
frame construction and brick veneer.5 
 
The majority of the township’s residents in the 1960s were recent white migrants, and 60 percent 
of them had only lived in the community for less than 5 years.6  By 1962, only 32 percent of 
Beavercreek Township residents worked in Dayton and only 28 percent shopped in the central 
city.7  Moreover, 58 percent of Beavercreek Township residents surveyed by the Committee of 
Eleven believed the “rural character” of Beavercreek was its best advantage, with 63 percent of 
residents planning on buying or building a new home in the community.8 
On August 21, 1964, Fairborn announced its intentions to annex 6,022 acres of 
Beavercreek Township, which would have more than double the 3,543 acre city at the time.9  
Governed by a Township Trustee, Beavercreek Township did not have same legislative rights as 
an incorporated municipality, making it vulnerable to annexation.  There were 31,300 acres in 
Beavercreek Township in 1962, less than 30 percent of which was developed, making it an 
enticing annexation plan for Fairborn as they needed more land for the newly opening Wright 





9 The Committee of Eleven, 1956-1980, MS-112, Series I: Administration, boxes 1-3, “Fairborn 
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State University.10  On August 27, 1964 a group of “community leaders and representatives of 
organizations” responded to Fairborn’s proposal by forming the Committee of Eleven.11  
According to the committee: “The threat of annexation to Fairborn to the wealthier northern part 
of Beavercreek in 1964 triggered the current petition to incorporate the entire township.”12  It 
would be the middle-class tax base of the unincorporated township which Fairborn and 
Beavercreek fought over. 
The primary objectives of the Committee of Eleven were to preserve low tax rates by 
attracting businesses, zoning out public housing and public transportation to protect urban 
rioting, and to maintaining racially segregated public schools.  Historian Robert O. Self argues 
the unification of white suburbanites around taxation issues was a common characteristic of 
suburbs across the country after the Second World War:  
They were almost universally middle-class professionals, industrialists, modest 
landholders, and merchants, men and women who had smaller, though no less real, 
financial stakes in incorporation… they were diverse in class background and place of 
origin, but the structure of the housing markets into which they entered in the postwar 
decades would begin to give them a common identity, to shape for them a set of concerns 
and interests that would unite more than divide them.13   
 
The Committee of Eleven embodied this tradition in the Dayton area and rallied support for 
incorporation mainly from local elites as well as middle-income residents.  Beavercreek 
Township, like other American suburbs, attracted business in an effort to offset taxes in the 
community and subsidize city services and public schools.  The 1962 report from Miami 
                                                      
10 The Committee of Eleven, “Beavercreek Committee of Eleven, Inc. Records,” 1956-1980, 
MS-112, Series I: Administration, boxes 1-3, “Who What Why: Chapter 1,” Wright State 
University archives, Fairborn, Ohio. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The Committee of Eleven, “Who What Why: Chapter 1.” 
13 Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 98. 
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University states that “it was the opinion of those interviewed at nearly all the industries that the 
development of the community as a completely residential area without the addition of new 
industry to help carry the increasing tax burden would force their withdrawal from the 
township.”14  The Committee of Eleven argued: 
Business and industry over the past century have located mostly where they can deal with 
a single authoritative type of government.  Any community that can attract business and 
industry must have “good zoning,” a fair tax rate, good schools and public services, 
libraries, cultural centers, etc.  A Beavercreek with a larger proportion of its tax duplicate 
comprised of business and industry would find its “homes” less burdened for school 
purposes.15 
 
Additionally, Harry Hammond – one of the presidents of the committee – contended that 
Fairborn’s annexation proposal “would provide an estimated $10,000 in tax revenue to Fairborn” 
and “that such items such as street surface maintenance and police protection would more than 
consume this amount” increasing taxes in Beavercreek.16  In 1967, 48.2 percent of Beavercreek 
Township residents supported bringing industry in order to enlarge their tax base.17   
Many suburbanites wanted to incorporate not only to preserve low taxes and their 
standard of living, but also because they feared urban problems would enter their communities 
through annexation.  In a brochure widely circulated throughout Beavercreek in the 1970s, the 
Committee of Eleven writes that “Dayton’s problems are legion and right now and they seem 
insurmountable… it seems unlikely, however, that Dayton’s problems will be solved by the 
                                                      
14 The Graduate Class of Urban Planning, “Survey report, Beavercreek Township, Ohio 1962” 
15 “Beavercreek Committee of Eleven, Inc. Records,” 1956-1980, MS-112, Series I: 
Administration, boxes 1-3, “Beavercreek Incorporation: What is it all about?,” Wright State 
University archives, Fairborn, Ohio. 
16 The Committee of Eleven, “Beavercreek Committee of Eleven, Inc. Records,” 1956-1980, 
MS-112, Series I: Administration, boxes 1-3, “Name Group to Study Beaver Incorporation,” 
Wright State University archives, Fairborn, Ohio. 
17 The Committee of Eleven, “Beavercreek Committee of Eleven, Inc. Records,” 1956-1980, 
MS-112, Series I: Administration, boxes 1-3, “Community Attitude survey Beavercreek 
township” Wright State University archives, Fairborn, Ohio. 
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annexation of additional territories.  More likely, such annexation would simply spread Dayton’s 
problems over a wider area and engulf a larger number of people.”18  To some suburbanites, 
Dayton’s problems seemed “insurmountable” and many Beavercreek residents believed home-
rule was the only method of preventing problems associated with cities from entering their 
community.  The Committee of Eleven argued that through incorporation, Beavercreek could 
choose how to zone their community to their liking, specifically in regard to the types of 
dwellings and transportation.19  For example, a survey found 71.2 percent of Beavercreek 
residents wanted multi-family housing zoned out of their community if the township were to 
incorporate.20 
By the early-1970s, Dayton-based civil rights organization concluded that the best way to 
alleviate the socioeconomic conditions on the Westside and to prevent future rioting was to 
desegregate Dayton Public Schools.  Although the Ohio General Assembly had adopted a 
resolution in 1887 requiring Ohio educational regulations to apply to all children regardless of 
race, Dayton Public Schools remained segregated due to neighborhood schools.21  In theory, 
neighborhood schools do not segregate populations, rather they follow neighborhood boundaries 
for convenience; but due to the history of residential segregation in Dayton, public schools 
remained segregated because blacks and whites lived in different neighborhoods.  Between 1940 
and 1963, the percentage of northern whites who supported school integration increased from 40 
percent to 75 percent.22  Yet, because northern whites did not see themselves as southern 
                                                      
18 The Committee of Eleven, “Beavercreek Incorporation: What is it all about?” 
19 Ibid. 
20 The Committee of Eleven, “Community Attitude survey Beavercreek township.”  
21 Watras, “The Racial Desegregation of Dayton, Ohio, Public Schools, 1966-2008,” 93. 
22 Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty, 465. 
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segregationists, northern suburbanites argued that they simply choose the best educational 
options for their children, rather than having avoided integration.23  Sugrue writes: 
Just as school districts had contended that they were not legally culpable for “de facto” 
segregation, so too did many white parents argue that it was not their fault that schools 
remained sharply divided by race… they were not “southern style” bigots; they exercised 
their freedom of choice to select the best schooling options for their children.  Blacks 
were left out either because of their personal, behavioral deficiencies or because of their 
own “free choice” to live in black neighborhoods.  In this version of events, the whole 
postwar history of residential segregation vanished.24 
 
This ideology allowed Dayton Public Schools to remain segregated through neighborhood 
schools, due to the fact that the city already segregated blacks and whites along the Great Miami 
River.  Joseph Watras writes “When the [Dayton] school board decided to build schools to serve 
special neighborhoods, it created segregated schools. Further, as the racial composition of 
neighborhoods changed, the board maintained segregation.”25 
On April 18, 1972, attorneys from the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) filed Brinkman v. Gilligan, asking for a metropolitan-wide school 
desegregation plan.  According to Watras: “This request upset parents in the surrounding towns 
of Oakwood and Kettering who attended school board meetings to complain about the possibility 
of their children going to Dayton’s schools.”26  It was this metropolitan desegregation plan which 
Beavercreek feared would ruin the quality of their child’s education.  Beavercreek Township 
Schools – which grew by 500 students per year from the late-1950s to the early-1960s – 
functioned as part of the Greene County Public Schools, with three elementary schools, a middle 
school, and a high school.  Moreover, 97 percent of Beavercreek Township students relied on 
                                                      
23 Ibid, 465-466. 
24 Ibid, 465-466. 
25 Watras, “The Racial Desegregation of Dayton, Ohio, Public Schools, 1966-2008,” 93. 
26 Ibid, 103. 
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school bus transportation, which made it easy for desegregationist’s to argue in favor of busing 
the growing suburban student population to Dayton Public Schools.27  The Committee of Eleven 
stated: “Many parents of school-age children are completely turned off by the prospect of radical 
changes in their children’s education.  Beavercreek has a fine school system and there is small 
chance that it would be improved by piece-meal annexations to other school districts.”28 
In 1976, US Supreme Court ruled in Brinkman v. Gilligan that unless NAACP attorneys 
could prove de jure segregation occurred in Dayton, Dayton suburbs were not required to 
participate in school desegregation.29  The lawsuit resulted in a mandated busing program strictly 
within the City of Dayton, busing black children to the eastside and white children to the 
Westside.30  The Department of Justice Civil Rights Division considered Dayton’s school 
desegregation programs to be one of the most successful in the United States, with no racial 
violence and high student retention rates.31  However, despite the success of the busing program, 
it did not involve the suburbs who had the wealth for better educational resources. 
While public schools were important, other factors caused many white Daytonians to 
move to the suburbs, such as the conveniences granted through homeownership as well as 
racially segregated neighborhoods.  In 1971, the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission 
surveyed Miami Valley residents about their housing and residential preferences and reported: 
“Almost all the interviewees indicated that, if given the choice, they would prefer a single-family 
dwelling to an apartment.  This strong yearning to live in their own home was associated with the 
                                                      
27 The Graduate Class of Urban Planning, “Survey report, Beavercreek Township, Ohio 1962” 
28 The Committee of Eleven, “Beavercreek Incorporation: What is it all about?” 
29 Ibid, 103. 
30 Ibid, 104. 
31 Ibid, 104. 
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desire for more personal freedom than they felt was possible in the average apartment life.”32  
Furthermore, the MVRPC concluded that in 1971, only 40 percent of whites in the Miami Valley 
Region as compared to 81 percent of blacks were willing to live in racially integrated 
neighborhoods.33  
After sixteen years of the Committee of Eleven fighting legal battles, on January 11, 
1980, they established the Village of Beavercreek; thirty days after which became the City of 
Beavercreek.34  The suburb grew quickly after its incorporation, increasing from 31,589 to 
45,193 residents between 1980 and 2010.35  In 2017, Beavercreek is on the cusp of 50,000 
residents.36  Although US-35 has extended through Beavercreek Township since the 1930s, the 
completion of I-675 through Beavercreek in 1987 stimulated suburban development along the 
interstate corridor, adversely disadvantaging Dayton furthering businesses and jobs from the 
urban core.  Mark S. Cundiff saw this process unfold and argued in his 1983 Master’s thesis The 
Impact of Beltways on Metropolitan Areas that highway construction would hurt low-income 
urban residents who needed jobs while allowing suburbs to build their tax bases: “Beltways and 
other infrastructure investments in most instances confer no benefits on the disadvantaged and 
low-income residents, many of whom live in central cities.  Suburban beltways, by drawing 
activity out of the central cities, affect their tax base and the ability of the city to deliver needed 
                                                      
32 Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission, “Directions for the Suburbs: Expanding Low 
and Moderate Income Housing Opportunities in the Dayton, Ohio Region (Report, 1971), 42. 
33 Ibid, 42. 
34 “Goodbye village; hello to Ohio’s 234th city,” Beavercreek Daily News, Jan. 12, 1980. 
35 “Data USA: Search, Map, Compare, and Download US Data,” Data USA, www.datausa.io 
36 Free To Ride, directed by Mathew Martin. 
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social services to those who need them the most.”37  This process unfolded outside Dayton after 
the opening of I-675 in 1986.  The highway helped eastern suburbs to develop  
rapidly as Wright State University, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and The Mall at Fairfield 
Commons continued to attract middle-class residents from the urban core.  The completion of I-
675 established a north-south half-loop between I-70 and US-35 which provided easy 
transportation around Dayton for automobile owners.  At the same time, I-675 created a physical 
border between Fairborn and Beavercreek, isolating the working-class suburb of Fairborn from 
Beavercreek.   
In 1993, as a direct result of the opening of I-675, The Mall at Fairfield Commons opened 
– adjacent to WSU on the opposite side of I-675 – in Beavercreek.  These two suburban 
developments attracted students and consumers from across the Miami Valley region.  This event 
mirrored similar processes across the United States in this period.  Historian Jon C. Teaford 
writes: “The proliferating malls were not just convenient supplements to the dominant downtown 
retailers.  They were new downtowns that were displacing the old central business districts as the 
focus of metropolitan shopping.  Shoppers were heading downtown less often and instead going 
to the mall.”38  The new mall became a Beavercreek’s “downtown,” as over 58 percent of 
Beavercreek residents traveled to Dayton for no other reason than to buy consumer goods 
unavailable in Beavercreek.39   
These “new downtowns,” however, offered more than accessibility.  They also marketed 
themselves as “safe spaces” free of urban problems and black people.  Teaford writes: 
                                                      
37 Mark Stephen Cundiff, “The Impact of Beltways on Metropolitan Areas: The Interstate 675-
Dayton Metropolitan Area Case Study” (Master’s thesis, Wright State University, 1983), 38-39. 
38 Jon C. Teaford, The Metropolitan Revolution: The Rise of Post-Urban America (New York 
City, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 89. 
39 The Committee of Eleven, “Community Attitude survey Beavercreek township.” 
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“Compared with downtown, the malls offered a socially homogeneous environment where 
suburbanites could ship among people like themselves without confronting the sidewalk 
panhandlers or ‘undesirable’ characters that could be found in the urban core.”40  By the early-
1990s, some white suburbanites complained about black youths traveling by public 
transportation from the Westside and shopping at the Dayton Mall.  One Dayton Daily News op-
ed report states: “It's about time that some rules were implemented at the Dayton Mall. The 
groups of teenagers were taking over.  Now maybe families can start shopping together again 
and feel safe.”41  Most of these youths were black and came from the RTA hub on 4 South Main 
Street, which was located in the heart of downtown.  In 1990, general manager of the Salem Mall 
Ron Bergman stated: “I think it [decline of the Salem Mall] is because the demographics of our 
area are changing. People unfairly attribute minorities to crime.”42   
By the late-2000s, Dayton Daily News had dubbed the Greater Dayton Regional Transit 
Authority’s downtown headquarter as the “Corner of Chaos”43 due to the “fights, robberies, drug 
sales, and open-air drug use” occurring between youth.44  Between 2000 and 2014, the location 
of RTA’s headquarters at the downtown block of Third and Main Streets led in the number of 
reported crime incidents within the City of Dayton.45  In 2010, the DPD and the RTA teamed up 
on a project known as “Reclaiming the Corner of Chaos,” in which they tried to end the stigma 
                                                      
40 Teaford, The Metropolitan Revolution, 89. 
41 “Speak Up: Brief Comments,” Dayton Daily News, Aug. 7, 2013. 
42 “Malls Still 1st on Shopping List Downtown’s Improving Crime Record has yet to Impress 
Shoppers,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 15, 1990. http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-
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44 “Reclaiming the Corner of Chaos,” (Greater Dayton Regional Transit Authority and Dayton 
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around public transportation in Dayton.  According to this report: “The RTA problem remained 
persistent, with extensive negative media coverage… the problems began to harm Dayton’s 
reputation and future economic development.  Many riders felt the hub was unsafe or only 
moderately safe.”46  Despite the report’s efforts to use statistical crime data and evidence to 
prove to Daytonians that riding public transportation is safe, reports about the Corner of Chaos 
suggested that criminals made bus stops unsafe. 
When the RTA requested to construct bus stops at The Mall at Fairfield Commons, the 
Beavercreek City Council already associated the RTA with the problems at the Dayton Mall.  
Until 2014, the closest bus stop for Daytonians working at The Mall at Fairfield Commons was 
at WSU, causing the majority-minority RTA ridership commuting to work to have to cross a six-
lane overpass above the interstate with no pedestrian walkways to reach Beavercreek.  Despite 
the effects lack of public transportation had on minorities, many suburbanites still opposed bus 
stops.  One suburbanite stated to the Dayton Daily News:  Why should Beavercreek invite 
problems?  For the record, it’s undeniable that bus stops adjacent to large shopping areas bring 
large problems. Many remember the slow death of the Salem Mall, the Third and Main Street 
combat zone, and the chaos created at the Dayton Mall in the near past due to unruly groups 
arriving on RTA buses.”47 
In an effort to provide public transportation from Dayton’s Westside to Beavercreek, in 
March of 2010 the RTA requested the installation of six bus stops along Pentagon Boulevard at 
The Mall at Fairfield Commons.  The Beavercreek City Council denied the RTA’s request on 
three occasions, stating concerns over design, expenses, and public safety. 
                                                      
46 Ibid. 
47 “More of Your Views on Bus Stops,” Dayton Daily News, Apr. 8, 2011. nl.newsbank.com/nl-
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On August 10, 2011, Leaders for Equality & Action in Dayton – a Dayton-based civil 
rights organization – responded to the continual denial of RTA’s proposal by filling allegations 
against the City of Beavercreek to the Federal Highway Administration Office of Civil Rights: 
[The] inability of African American job seekers to obtain transportation to the 
Beavercreek area has been a major barrier to employment… the City of Beavercreek’s 
criteria and methods for deciding whether to allow RTA transit stops in Beavercreek, 
which resulted in the denial of the application for those stops had the effect of subjecting 
African Americans, who disproportionately ride transit, to discrimination.48 
 
As a direct result of LEAD’s allegations, the FHWA Office of Civil Rights began an 
investigation into the legality of Beavercreek’s objection on February 22, 2012.  The main 
argument of the FHWA Office of Civil Rights derived from Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 which states: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”49  The City of Beavercreek risked losing $10.7 million in FHWA funding.50 
Since the federal government subsidized highway construction, the FHWA determined 
that Beavercreek City Council used “facially neutral” excuses to keep public transportation out 
of their suburb, which disproportionately affected RTA ridership.  73 percent of RTA’s ridership 
was nonwhite, of which 64 percent of whom are black, with only 27 of RTA ridership being 
white.51  A survey of Beavercreek residents found that 90 percent were against the installation of 
                                                      
48 Federal Highway Administration to Michael Cornell, Stanley A. Hirtle, and Ellis Jacobs, June 
23, 2013, (report by the FHWA to ABLE) 
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bus stops, primarily over safety concerns.52  One Beavercreek councilwoman stated “It’s hard for 
me to understand those who suggest that Beavercreek citizens have no good or reasonable basis 
for their concerns, given all of the issues that have been at the Salem mall, the Dayton mall, and 
downtown Dayton.” Councilmembers made “coded” requests for requirements like “climate 
controlled” bus stops and hi-tech security cameras for bus stops used only six times a day.53  
According to attorney Ellis Jacobs at LEAD: “Even though the language being used to turn down 
the buses was very coded, it was all about crime.”54  The FHWA threatened to cut all 
transportation funding to the City of Beavercreek due to the desperate impact their policies had 
on RTA’s majority-minority ridership, which forced Beavercreek City Council to open bus stops 
on Pentagon Boulevard in January of 2014.55 
Tensions surrounding this decision spilled over into a local case of police misconduct that 
garnered national attention.  On August 5, 2014, white police officer Sean Williams shot and 
killed John Crawford III – a 22-year-old black man and resident of Fairborn – at the Walmart at 
The Mall at Fairfield Commons.56  This shooting sheds light on some of the associations the 
Beavercreek City Council had between blacks, public transportation, and crime.  The 9-1-1 caller 
reported Crawford was holding an “assault rifle” and was aiming it at shoppers.  However, 
Walmart surveillance footage showed no evidence of any these actions, rather Crawford was 
                                                      
52 Ibid, 9. 
53 Free To Ride, directed by Mathew Martin. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ellis Jacobs, “Let the people ride: Bringing buses to Beavercreek and revitalizing civil rights 
enforcement,” Ohio State Bar Association, 
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holding a BB gun.57  The Beavercreek Police Department spent $430,000 in legal defenses for 
the two involved officers, rather than paying a settlement to the victim’s family.58  In the end, the 
Beavercreek Police Department placed Officer Williams on administrative leave, eventually 
reinstating his rights on July 11, 2017 as the US Department of Justice announced it would not 
seek federal charges.59  
Although separated by a half century, the Committee of Eleven’s campaign for municipal 
incorporation and Beavercreek City Council’s efforts to bar public transportation reveal notions 
many suburbanites have held about cities and public transportation.  From 1964 until 1980, the 
Committee of Eleven campaigned to protect the unincorporated township from annexation by 
working-class Fairborn or having their children bussed to Dayton Public Schools.  The 
Committee of Eleven fought to attract businesses in order to help subsidize suburban tax rates.  
In a similar manner, the Beavercreek City Council continual denial of RTA bus stops at The 
Mall at Fairfield Commons was done in an effort to preserve in the mall’s middle-class ambiance 
the fear that urbanites would bring crime or blight.  These assumptions often came from the 
stigmatization developed during the Dayton Riot of 1966, that black people will only come into 
your community to cause trouble.  More importantly, many suburbanites have attributed the 
conditions on Dayton’s Westside to personal faults, rather than the legacy of housing 
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discrimination and high unemployment, which tends to force city residents to commute to the 
























When the Federal Highway Administration Office of Civil Rights ruled that Beavercreek 
City Council violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it revealed some of the notions 
many Americans have held towards both suburbia, inner-cities, and public transportation.  The 
fact that many Americans believe cities have always existed in their contemporary informs our 
understanding of the Beavercreek busing controversy in two ways.  First: because many 
Americans view their suburbs as the result of “de facto segregation,” they ignore the historical 
realities that the government supported suburbanization and helped make them racially 
exclusive.  Their views often ignore the historical diversity of suburbs, housing, and 
transportation in the United States and view the contemporary urban landscape as having always 
existed.  More importantly, this belief continues to cause many Americans to view the 
socioeconomic conditions of cities, such as on Dayton’s Westside, as unrelated to the history of 
suburbanization.  Second: the efforts of the Committee of Eleven and the Beavercreek City 
Council to protect their economic interests demonstrates that because many white suburbanites 
believe they have no historical connection to or obligation to the socioeconomic conditions on 
Dayton’s Westside, it is their right to segregate themselves from those problems. 
Many Daytonians believe that residents have always commuted to work along the city’s 
140 miles of freeway for an average of 20.6 minutes each day to jobs at Dayton’s largest 
employers including Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and The Mall at Fairfield Commons.1  
However, in the early-nineteenth century, most Daytonians lived at their place of work or lived 
                                                      
1 Miami Valley Regional Transit Authority, “A Summary of Going Places: An Integrated Land 
Use Vision for the Miami Valley Region,” (Report) May 2015. 
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within a one mile walking distance of it.  By the turn of the nineteenth century, the electric 
streetcar allowed Dayton’s profiting industrialist to build mansions in Oakwood, only accessible 
by streetcar.  Additionally, expensive mortgages and restrictive covenants made homeownership 
unattainable to most Daytonians.   
It would not be until the New Deal and the advent of the automobile that allowed a mass-
migration of the white middle-class from Dayton.  The New Deal Era established the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation, the Federal Housing Administration, and the Veteran’s 
Administration, which brought affordable homeownership to middle-class Americans.  However, 
because these federal agencies prioritized the construction of new suburban homes over the 
rehabilitation of older ones in urban cores, this effectively segregated blacks to the Dayton’s 
older housing stock on the Westside.  After the Second World War, as these federal agencies 
made suburban homeownership more affordable than urban ranting, Charles C. Huber mass-
produced affordable homes for Daytonians in Huber Heights.  Unlike Oakwood residents, who 
relied on public transportation which connected them to the central business district, the 
construction of I-70 and the affordability of the automobile moved business and industry to 
Huber Heights, economically abandoning the urban core.  
During the Postwar Era, New Deal housing policies, the growth of the automobile, as 
well as deindustrialization in the urban core helped created the contemporary hyper-segregation 
in the Dayton Metropolitan Area.  The Interstate Highway System helped promote the 
automobile as the primary means of transportation for suburbs which ended mass-transit in 
Dayton.  Not only did urbanites lose funding for their primary means of transportation, but they 
often could not access jobs in suburbs without an automobile.  Additionally, the construction of 
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I-75 for the purpose of suburban development came at the cost of destroying the black Westside 
and displacing hundreds of residents.  
The inability of the Supporting Committee on Preventative Effort and Moving Ahead 
Together to alleviate the socioeconomic pressures on the Westside, due to their inter-
organizational conflicts, helped turn many blacks to seek more radical solutions to segregation.  
Even though numerous factors contributed to the Dayton Riot of 1966, many whites blamed 
black leftists and the Black Power Movement for trying to destroy Dayton.  Additionally, they 
often blamed it on the character flaws and housing choices of blacks, rather than deliberately 
racist housing and transportation policies.  Many suburbanites feared these riots would spread to 
their communities and did not want to support a declining urban core.  These beliefs ultimately 
pushed communities like Beavercreek Township to incorporate out of a misplaced sense of self-
preservation. 
While objectively the Committee of Eleven protected their business interests and public 
schools, their incorporation concentrated middle-class wealth in Beavercreek.  They not only 
helped bar Dayton schoolchildren from the educational resources available from Beavercreek’s 
tax base, but also helped push employment opportunities to The Mall at Fairfield Commons as 
Dayton deindustrialized.  In the same way, while the Beavercreek City Council many have 
fought to keep public transportation out of their community for many reasons, the result had a 
significant impact on the RTA’s minority-majority ridership.   
 The legacy of suburbanization in Dayton remains relevant today as Dayton continues to 
sprawl.  In 1960 at 262,332 residents, with a white population at 78.1 percent white and a black 
population at 21.8 percent.  However, since 1960, Dayton’s population has declined to 141,368 
residents, 51.6 percent of whom are white and 40.1 percent of whom are black.  At the same 
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time, since 1990, Beavercreek’s population 33,544 to almost 50,000.  The trend of 
suburbanization in Dayton does not seem to be ending anytime soon, and suburbanites continue 
to fight to preserve their economic advantages as well as protect themselves from their fear of 
minorities.  While it is not always blatant discrimination, the trend over the past 100 years has 
been whites benefiting from policies that not only create inequalities but promote fears and 
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